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Abstract 
Using geographically disaggregated data and exploiting an 
instrumental variable strategy, we show that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments (CAAA) were progressive. The CAAA created 
incentives for local regulators to target the initially dirtiest areas for 
cleanup, creating heterogeneity in the incidence of air quality 
improvements that favored lower-income households. Based on 
house price appreciation, households in the lowest quintile of the 
income distribution received annual benefits from the program equal 
to 0.3% of their income on average during the 1990s, over twice as 
much as those in the highest quintile. 
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I. Introduction 
 Conventional wisdom holds that environmental policies are regressive (Fullerton 2011, 
Banzhaf 2011, Bento 2013). This is in part because the costs of these policies tend to fall 
disproportionately on lower income households, who generally spend a higher fraction of their 
income on energy-intensive goods and are employed in larger numbers in energy-related 
industries. There is also some evidence that the benefits of environmental policies tend to accrue 
mainly to higher income households. Higher income households are more likely to be 
homeowners, and thus are more likely to reap the benefits of any capitalization of environmental 
improvements into property values.  
 The purpose of this paper is to carefully explore the distribution of the benefits of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), an important component in understanding the overall 
distributional impacts of the program. First enacted in 1970, the Clean Air Act established 
standards for the ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants with the goal of improving air 
quality and protecting human health. Following amendments in 1990, the Clean Air Act began 
regulating particulates less than 10 micrometers in diameter (PM10), for which the negative health 
effects were deemed particularly severe. A county is designated to be out of attainment with the 
standard if at least one of the monitors within the county had concentrations of PM10 exceeding 
the standard.  
 Despite being the most ambitious federal environmental legislation to date, the existing 
literature provides little evidence on the extent to which the benefits in air quality improvements 
induced by the Clean Air Act and its amendments accrued to different segments of the population. 
Several studies that have attempted to measure the distribution of the benefits of the program have 
used locational equilibrium models and focused on a limited number of metropolitan areas, 
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emphasizing within-metropolitan areas differences in the distribution of benefits that result from 
general equilibrium adjustments in housing prices (Sieg et al. 2004, Tra 2010). Other studies have 
examined the aggregate impacts on certain subgroups of the population, such as renters and 
homeowners (Grainger 2012), but have not accounted for important differences in the impacts of 
the program across households within these subgroups. 
 We provide new, compelling evidence that the benefits of the 1990 CAAA, measured by 
capitalization of air quality improvements in housing prices and rents, were in fact progressive, 
contrary to what these past studies suggest. First, we demonstrate that the air quality improvements 
induced by the 1990 CAAA were highly localized, as local regulators had incentives to target the 
areas around non-attainment monitors as a strategy to ensure their counties were in attainment with 
federal standards. Second, we estimate capitalization of the air quality changes induced by the 
program. For homes located within five miles of a non-attainment monitor, which we show to be 
owned by relatively low-income households on average, our estimate of the elasticity of house 
prices with respect to PM10 reductions is about -0.6. For homes located further away, which tend 
to be owned by more affluent households, we detect sharply less appreciation attributable to the 
1990 CAAA. Rental prices also appear to have increased in a localized fashion, but the 
capitalization of air quality improvements into rents is substantially smaller and less consistent 
than for housing prices.  
 Consequently, lower income homeowners tended to enjoy the greatest benefits from the 1990 
CAAA, as these were the homeowners located in areas that experienced the largest improvements 
in air quality. Based on house price appreciation, households in the lowest quintile of the income 
distribution received annual benefits from the program equal to 0.3% of their income on average 
during the 1990s, over twice as much as those in the highest quintile. Importantly, though, while 
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poorer households living close to monitors benefited greatly from the reductions in pollution 
induced by the 1990 CAAA, a larger number of households living further from monitors also 
benefited, but each to a smaller extent.  
 Our main empirical challenge is to estimate the causal effect of declines in PM10 on housing 
prices. To do this, we assemble a unique dataset and exploit a quasi-experimental research design. 
The key components of the data are monitor-level readings of PM10 concentrations and tract-level 
census data on housing prices, rents, and socio-economic characteristics. Combining these data 
with attainment designations, we follow Chay and Greenstone (2005) in implementing an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach to overcome biases from confounding factors that are 
simultaneously correlated with pollution and housing prices. In Chay and Greenstone’s (2005) 
work, which is conducted at the county level, county attainment designations under the 1970 Clean 
Air Act serve as an instrument for changes in pollution over the decade. Our empirical strategy 
differs in three important ways from that of Chay and Greenstone (2005). First, motivated by both 
the degree of observed heterogeneity in demographic characteristics of households as well as 
observed variation in air quality improvements within counties, we conduct our analysis of the 
CAAA in the 1990s at the monitor level as opposed to the county level. Second, we rely on both 
monitor and county attainment designations as instruments for changes in PM10. We use monitor 
attainment designations as an instrument because it better matches the behavior of local regulators 
and is a good predictor for the spatial variation in the drops of PM10 within non-attainment counties 
with multiple monitors. Finally, instead of a simple binary instrument that only captures attainment 
status, we use a more sophisticated instrument that reflects the persistence of non-attainment status 
to capture differential responses depending on the severity of violations. Our spatially 
disaggregated approach exploiting the behavior of local regulators allows us to uncover the 
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incidence of the program in a more comprehensive way than past studies, and provides new 
estimates highlighting how the program’s benefits were progressively distributed, with lower 
income households experiencing larger welfare gains on average than higher income households.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of air 
quality regulation and describes local regulator behavior in response to the CAAA. Section III 
discusses the data we use in this study and provides some descriptive statistics. We describe our 
identification strategy and detail our empirical model in Section IV, then present our results along 
with robustness tests in Section V. We discuss the implications of our findings for understanding 
the progressivity or regressivity of environmental policies in Section VI. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Environmental Regulation and the Clean Air Act Amendments 
A.  Particulate Matter Regulation under the CAAA 
 Particulate matter (PM) is a term used for a class of solid and liquid air pollutants. PM 
originates from a variety of mobile and stationary sources, including motor vehicles, construction 
sites, and power plants. With the 1970 Clean Air Act, which was an extension of the original 1963 
Clean Air Act, the EPA was authorized to enforce a National Ambient Air Quality Standard 
(NAAQS) for total suspended particulates (TSPs), which include PM less than 100 micrometers 
in diameter. A nationwide network of air pollution monitors allowed the EPA to track TSPs, and 
two types of standards were used to determine whether pollution levels were sufficiently dangerous 
to warrant regulatory action. As the U.S. EPA (2005) states, “primary standards set limits to protect 
public health, including the health of ‘sensitive’ populations such as asthmatics, children, and the 
elderly. Secondary standards set limits to protect public welfare, including protection against 
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decreased visibility, damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings.” For each standard, the 
EPA considered both a 24-hour average and an annual average.  
 In addition to adding provisions for regulating ozone depletion, addressing acid rain, and 
establishing new auto gasoline reformulation requirements, the amendments to the Clean Air Act 
passed in 1990 began regulating particulates less than ten micrometers in diameter (PM10), for 
which the negative health effects were deemed particularly severe. While particulates larger than 
ten micrometers in diameter can generally be filtered in the nose and throat, those less than ten 
micrometers in diameter cannot and may cause health problems if sufficient quantities settle in the 
bronchi and lungs. The primary standard under the 1990 CAAA required that the three-year 
geometric average of PM10 concentration for each monitor in a county be less than 50 ?g?m3. It 
further required via a secondary standard that the 24-hour average concentrations at a monitor not 
exceed 150 ?g?m3.  
 If any monitor within a county exceeds these standards, the EPA can designate the county 
“non-attainment.” As part of a state implementation plan (SIP), a non-attainment county is required 
outline its strategy to reduce air pollution levels in order to be compliant with the NAAQS. If 
pollution levels continue to exceed the standards or if a county fails to abide by an approved plan, 
the EPA can impose sanctions on the county in violation. These sanctions may include the 
withholding of federal highway funds and the imposition of technological “emission offset 
requirements” on new or modified sources of emissions within the county (National Archives and 
Records Administration 2005).  
B.  Local Regulator Behavior 
 For a county to be deemed out of attainment, pollution readings from only one monitor within 
that county need to exceed the primary or secondary standards. As such, in counties with more 
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than one monitor, local regulators are likely to allocate a disproportionate amount of their effort 
toward reducing PM10 levels around monitors with pollution readings near or above the federal 
thresholds, as these monitors put the county as a whole at risk of falling out of attainment.1  
 Auffhammer et al. (2009) provide evidence of strategic behavior among local regulators. They 
show that the average drop in PM10 near non-attainment monitors located in non-attainment 
counties relative to attainment monitors in non-attainment counties was a sizable 5.43 ?g?m3 per 
year. They interpret their results as evidence that regulators target non-attainment monitors for 
more aggressive action, and thereby minimize future expected costs for the county as a whole. 
Additional discussions with EPA and South Coast Air Quality Management District officials 
confirm such behavior. At the local level, policymakers have various ways to enforce the 
regulations either directly through the CAAA or indirectly through related policies that will tend 
to result in uneven reductions in air pollution across space.2 In this paper, we leverage spatial 
heterogeneity in monitoring and enforcement efforts within counties to measure the distribution of 
the benefits of the 1990 CAAA. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 This section briefly discusses the sources and relevant features of the air quality, regulatory, 
and housing and population datasets we use in the analysis. We refer the reader to the online 
appendix for additional details about the data.  
                                                     
1 It is also well documented in the epidemiological literature that the relationship between mortality and particular 
matter is non-linear. Dockery et al. (1993) estimate convex damage functions, providing further rationale for 
prioritizing particularly dirty areas for cleanup. 
2 For example, officials may step up inspections and enforcement at polluting facilities in dirty areas. Plants may be 
required to install equipment to reduce PM and officials may use permitting rules to ensure that facilities meet 
guidelines for regulated emissions. Construction sites and dirt roads may also be kept wet to limit dust. Additionally, 
some areas impose direct regulations on the oxygenated content of fuels, more stringent zoning regulations that make 
it harder for polluting facilities to locate in these areas, traffic alleviating policies and smart growth strategies to reduce 
emissions from transportation, and paving of side roads. 
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A.  Air Quality Data 
 The PM10 concentrations were obtained from the Air Quality Standards (AQS) database, which 
is maintained by the EPA. For each monitor, the database includes the annual mean concentrations, 
the highest concentration recorded in any 24-hour period, the geospatial coordinates of the 
monitor, and several reliability measures. For the purposes of our analysis, we restrict attention to 
monitors with reliable readings.3 Further, we require that monitors have at least one reliable 
reading in each of the following sets of years: 1989-1990, 1991-1996, and 1999-2000. This enables 
us to match concentration levels with decennial census data and construct instruments from mid-
decade observations.4 The reliability and timing requirements place significant demands on the set 
of monitors, and as a result, our final sample consists of 375 monitors located in 230 counties. 
While only a small fraction of counties in the U.S., these 230 counties are located in densely 
populated areas and contain approximately one-third of the total U.S. population.5 Observed 
changes in pollution in our sample are also consistent with recent work using a broader sample of 
monitors. Based on our sample, the average concentrations of PM10 declined by 19% in the 1990s, 
which is consistent with the findings of Auffhammer et al. (2009), who rely on a much larger 
sample of monitors. 
 We obtained the county attainment designations from the annual code of federal regulations 
(CFR). While the EPA designates each county in the U.S. as attainment or non-attainment, not all 
counties contain air quality monitors that meet the time and reliability requirements necessary to 
                                                     
3 See the online appendix for more details on the requirements for reliability. 
4 If a monitor has a valid observation from 1990 (2000), then that observation is attached to the 1990 (2000) census 
data. If a monitor does not have a valid observation from 1990 (2000), but does from 1989 (1999), then the 1989 
(1999) observation is attached to the 1990 (2000) census data.  
5 Figure A1 in the online appendix shows the geographic distribution of the 375 monitors that are included in our 
sample. Table A1 in the online appendix shows that 1990 PM10 levels are higher on average for included monitors 
relative to the broader population of monitors. However, the decadal changes are insignificantly different across each 
group. Further, in robustness tests, we relax the monitor reliability requirements. 
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be included in our sample.6 For the purpose of our analysis, we also assign attainment status to 
each monitor for each year using the EPA’s rules. If in year t a monitor’s annual PM10 
concentration is greater than 50 ?g?m3 or its 24-hour concentration exceeds 150 ?g?m3 more than 
once, then that monitor is designated non-attainment in year t+1. 
B.  Demographic and Housing Characteristics 
 The demographic and housing data come from the GeoLytics Neighborhood Change Database. 
This dataset aggregates decennial census microdata to normalized tract boundaries such that the 
data are directly comparable across time periods. For the years 1990 and 2000, we obtained tract-
level data for the median owner-occupied housing value, median rental rate, housing 
characteristics, and socioeconomic characteristics. A complete list of these variables appears in 
Table A2 in the online appendix.7  
 Using mapping software, we matched each monitor to a single census tract. We then calculated 
the distance between each tract in the data and the closest tract containing a monitor. For the 
purposes of our empirical analysis, we construct concentric ring buffers around each monitor at 
distances of 0-1, 1-3, 3-5, 5-10, and 10-20 miles. The rings are constructed such that county lines 
and lines equidistant with other monitors in the same county truncate the rings. The number of 
tracts, or partial tracts, included in a ring initially increases with distance, but then declines, 
reflecting the facts that tracts are larger in rural areas and that at larger radii, rings bump into county 
lines and lines equidistant with other monitors.8 Following Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) and 
                                                     
6 Figure A2 in the online appendix displays the 1990 attainment status for each county in our sample. The spatial 
distribution of non-attainment counties confirms widely held beliefs of which areas are most polluted. The 
southwestern U.S. (particularly Los Angeles), mountain cities like Denver and Salt Lake, and rust belt cities (Chicago, 
Detroit, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh) are all in the non-attainment group. While some counties are persistently non-
attainment through the 1990s, individual monitors show much more variation. 
7 We omit tracts that have missing values for the variables of interest or report anomalous house price changes; for 
further details, see the online appendix. 
8 We illustrate the construction of the rings for the Chicago metro area in Figure A3 in the online appendix. 
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Banzhaf and Walsh (2008), we aggregate housing and socioeconomic data for all tracts falling 
within a given ring, using weights equal to each tract’s land area within the relevant ring multiplied 
by its population.9 Cumulatively, the rings cover 92% of total county population (see Table A3 in 
the online appendix).  
C.  Descriptive Statistics 
 Figure 1 shows PM10 reductions between 1990 and 2000 for monitors in attainment located in 
counties in attainment, for monitors in attainment located in counties out of attainment, and for 
monitors out of attainment.10 The decline in concentrations for in-attainment monitors located in 
attainment and non-attainment counties is 5.1 ?g?m3 and 7.0 ?g?m3, respectively. The out-of-
attainment monitor group experiences substantially larger declines in concentrations over the 
decade, 15.4 ?g?m3 on average. This pattern highlights the substantial within-county variation in 
pollution driven by the CAAA and its attainment designations. As we would expect, and as 
Auffhammer et al. (2009) also show, PM10 reductions are localized and center around monitors 
responsible for inciting regulatory action. That the EPA’s non-attainment designations were 
generally effective in reducing pollution levels is consistent with past work documenting the 
enforcement of air quality standards under the 1990 CAAA (Henderson 1996, Nadeau 1997, 
Becker and Henderson 2000). We further explore the spatial scale of pollution reductions 
associated with non-attainment designations in the empirical analysis.11 
                                                     
9 When tracts are aggregated to a ring level, median house value and median family income lose their “median” 
nature, but instead are weighted averages of medians.  
10 A monitor is classified as non-attainment if it exceeds either of the EPA standards at some point during 1992-
1997. A monitor is classified as county non-attainment if it is located in a county that is non-attainment at some point 
during 1992-1997, but is not non-attainment itself. All but one monitor designated as non-attainment are located in 
non-attainment counties. 
11 In a series of tests, we examined how pollution levels and changes in pollution across monitors varied with 
distance between monitors. In Table A4 in the online appendix, we find a strong positive correlation between PM10 
levels in 1990 that diminishes only slightly as we move away from the monitors; however, it is still strong and positive 
for monitors even 50 miles apart. More important for our empirical analysis, the correlation in changes in pollution 
between 1990 and 2000 fades more quickly with distance, with the correlation falling from close to 0.7 for monitors 
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 Table 1 breaks out demographic and housing characteristics, including 1990 levels as well as 
changes between 1990 and 2000, for tracts with monitors in attainment in counties that are in 
attainment, monitors in attainment that are in counties out of attainment, and monitors that are out 
of attainment. Consistent with Figure 1, the first row shows that monitors out of attainment had 
higher PM10 levels in 1990 as well as greater reductions in PM10 between 1990 and 2000. It also 
shows that the initially dirtiest areas near non-attainment monitors typically had lower initial house 
values and income levels as well as higher shares of minorities and unemployment rates.  
 Figure 2 plots non-parametric relationships between a tract’s distance to the closest air quality 
monitor in our sample and selected demographic and housing characteristics of that tract, including 
median housing price, median rent, share of housing units owner occupied, median family income, 
population density, share college educated, share white, and the unemployment rate in 1990. 
Figure 2 highlights systematic variation across space for each socioeconomic variable; as the 
distance from a monitor increases, median housing and rental values, the share of units owner 
occupied, median incomes, share college educated, and share white all increase, whereas 
population density and unemployment rates decrease. Figure 2 underscores the fact that the 
monitors are placed in tracts that are systematically different than other tracts and the county as a 
whole. This is a direct consequence of the EPA’s requirement that monitors be located in densely 
populated areas.12 We exploit how demographic and housing characteristics vary as a function of 
distance to the closest monitor in the empirical analysis to help identify the distribution of benefits 
of the pollution reductions induced by the 1990 CAAA. 
                                                     
within one mile of one another to around 0.40 for monitors 20-40 miles apart. The precise correlation depends on 
which monitors we include in the sample and what time period we consider, but the pattern is the same regardless. 
12 See http:??epa.gov?airquality?montring.html#montypes. Plots for 2000 characteristics are similar to those for 1990, 
indicating that the characteristics of neighborhoods close to and further from monitors are fairly stable over time. 
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IV. Empirical Approach 
 In this section, we outline our econometric approach to estimating the implicit value of air 
quality derived from housing market data. We rely on the hedonic model developed by Rosen 
(1974), which characterizes a market for heterogeneous goods and allows one to assign prices to 
the attributes of those goods. We estimate regressions using spatially disaggregated data in order 
to examine how the capitalization of air quality improvements varies across space, which, as 
discussed in the previous section, has important implications for the incidence of the 1990 CAAA. 
 Our analysis takes place at the monitor level, with demographic and housing information based 
on rings of different radii around each monitor. We separately estimate our models for owner-
occupied house values and for rents; given a large fraction of renters are low-income households, 
determining the impact of air quality changes induced by the 1990 CAAA on rents is important in 
evaluating its overall distributional consequences.  
 Our basic specification is  
      ,           (1) 
where pi is the natural log of either median owner-occupied housing value or median rent in area 
i, PMi is the concentration of PM10 in area i, and Xi is a vector of area i’s housing and neighborhood 
characteristics.13 In equation (1), prices, PM10 concentrations, and the vector of controls are 
                                                     
13 The matrix X includes the following variables, all differenced between 2000 and 1990: total housing units, percent 
of housing units occupied, percent of housing units owner occupied, percent of housing units heated by coal, percent 
of housing units heated by wood, percent of housing units without a kitchen, percent of housing units with full 
plumbing, percent of owner-occupied units with two bedrooms, percent of owner-occupied units with three bedrooms, 
percent of owner-occupied units with four bedrooms, percent of owner-occupied units with five or more bedrooms, 
percent of owner-occupied units that are single detached units, percent of owner-occupied units that are single attached 
units, percent of owner-occupied units that are mobile homes, percent of owner-occupied units that were built 5-10 
years ago, percent of owner-occupied units that were built 10-20 years ago, percent of owner-occupied units that were 
built 20-30 years ago, percent of owner-occupied units that were built 30-40 years ago, percent of owner-occupied 
units that were built 40-50 years ago, percent of owner-occupied units that were built 50 or more years ago, percent 
of renter-occupied units with two bedrooms, percent of renter-occupied units with three bedrooms, percent of renter-
occupied units with four bedrooms, percent of renter-occupied units with five or more bedrooms, percent of renter-
occupied units that are single detached units, percent of renter-occupied units that are single attached units, percent of 
iiii PMp ?? ?????? ?X
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differenced between 2000 and 1990. This first-difference approach controls for both observable 
and unobservable time invariant characteristics of areas that might be correlated with house prices 
and air quality, such as climate and topographical features, transportation infrastructure, and 
population density. In this time differenced specification, ? measures capitalization.  
 As Table 1 suggests, monitor non-attainment areas differ along several observable dimensions 
from monitor in-attainment areas, irrespective of whether the non-attainment monitors are in non-
attainment counties or not. In particular, monitor non-attainment areas have relatively low house 
prices, low median incomes, low shares of residents that are white, high unemployment rates, and 
low shares of houses with three or more bedrooms.14 To the extent that these characteristics are 
time-invariant, a differencing approach will sweep out these effects. However, changes in 
unmeasured characteristics of locations that are correlated with PM10 and also independently affect 
p might still bias estimates of ?. For example, expansions in local transportation infrastructure or 
increases in overall economic activity could affect both pollution levels and housing prices. We 
would generally expect such correlations to bias the coefficient on pollution toward zero. 
 We exploit the 1990 CAAA and its implications for local regulator behavior to address the 
simultaneity that would otherwise exist between house prices and pollution. Our identification 
                                                     
renter-occupied units that are mobile homes, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 5-10 years ago, percent 
of renter-occupied units that were built 10-20 years ago, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 20-30 years 
ago, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 30-40 years ago, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 
40-50 years ago, percent of renter-occupied units that were built 50 or more years ago, median family income, percent 
of residents with less than a high school degree, percent of residents with a college degree, percent of residents who 
are Black, percent of residents who are Latino, percent of residents under the age of five, percent of residents over the 
age of 65, percent of residents that are foreign born, percent of households that are headed by a female, percent of 
residents that live in the same house as five years ago, percent of residents that are unemployed, percent of residents 
that are employed in manufacturing, percent of residents that are below the poverty line, percent of residents that 
receive public assistance, population density, and local home price indices. Sample means for these variables at the 
tract level are provided in Table A2 in the online appendix. 
14 With regard to the changes between 1990 and 2000 reported in Table 1, changes in PM10 conform to our 
expectations, but surprisingly, changes in median house values do not. While aggregate data at the county level show 
that house prices appreciated more in non-attainment counties, house prices at the tract level do not appreciate in line 
with changes in PM10. This lack of correlation highlights the importance of including other covariates that affect house 
values in our specification. 
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strategy builds on that of Chay and Greenstone (2005), who instrument for changes in pollution at 
the county level between 1970 and 1980 using county non-attainment status in the mid-1970s. 
However, following more recent work examining the more localized externalities associated with 
environmental improvements (e.g., Gamper-Rabindran et al. 2011), we exploit heterogeneity 
within counties in pollution levels and socio-economic characteristics as well as in officials’ 
behavior. Figure 1 highlights the substantial degree of within-county variation in pollution 
reductions, which is in part driven by local regulator efforts to bring dirtier monitors in line with 
the EPA’s standards. Our IV strategy therefore uses monitor attainment status as an instrument for 
localized pollution reductions.15 We also consider overidentified models that use both monitor 
attainment status and county attainment status as instruments. Further, to capture heterogeneity in 
the persistence of non-attainment and its potentially differential impact on the extent of air quality 
improvements, our instruments are constructed as ratios of years out of attainment. Specifically, 
our monitor (county) instrument is the ratio of years that the monitor (county) is out of attainment 
to the number of years for which there is a record during the time span 1992-1997. With the county 
instrument, the denominator is always six years; for the monitor instrument, due to some monitors 
not having valid data for all years, the denominator can vary from one to six years.16  
 The first-stage and reduced-form equations of the IV analysis can be written as 
                            (2)  
          ,              (3) 
                                                     
15 Non-attainment could result from violation of either the annual standard or the 24-hour standard. 
16 While we include in our sample only monitors that have valid PM10 readings in both 1990 and 2000, our ratio 
instrument avoids further selection issues that might arise if we were to require monitors to have a reading one or 
more particular years during the 1990s. As discussed in Section V.D., the results are similar when we use alternative 
instruments as well as when we relax reliability requirements for monitors in the sample. 
iiii NPM ?? ????? ?X
iiii vNp ?????? X?
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where the instrument Ni is equal to the ratio of non-attainment years during the time span 1992 to 
1997. For ?IV to be a consistent estimate of the effect of changes in PM10 on prices, it must be the 
case that non-attainment status affects changes in PM10 and that, conditional on other observable 
neighborhood and housing characteristics, non-attainment status only affects house prices through 
its impact on PM10.17 As Figure 1 suggests, and as we show more rigorously in Section V.A., the 
first condition clearly holds. While we cannot conclusively show that the exclusion restriction 
holds, we include an extensive set of controls and conduct a battery of robustness tests aimed in 
part at mitigating concerns that any shocks to prices between 1990 and 2000 are not orthogonal to 
shocks to PM10.18     
 We apply the reduction in pollution measured at the monitor level to each ring, although based 
on the reduced-form results presented below and the observed gradient in the magnitude of 
pollution changes, there is reason to believe that declines in pollution tend to be larger in closer 
rings than in further away rings. Given this, we would expect estimates of ? in equation (2) to be 
upper bounds on the true reduction in pollution experienced in more distant rings. In turn, we 
would expect the IV estimates of ? in equation (1) to be biased downward in absolute value for the 
rings further away, meaning that the magnitude of the estimated effects could be larger than we 
find.19 
                                                     
17 Regulatory action in response to non-attainment could affect other pollutants besides PM10, such as ozone. 
Changes in PM10 are more likely to be capitalized into housing markets given it is visible to the unaided human eye, 
unlike most other air pollutants. 
18 One concern would be if measures aimed at reducing pollution to achieve or maintain attainment (e.g., curtailing 
manufacturing activity) independently affect house prices. However, we believe that with our extensive set of 
covariates (including, for example, manufacturing employment), we effectively control for such possible channels.   
19 To the extent that people were cognizant of possible increases in the stringency of pollution control measures 
prior to 1990 and anticipated future air quality improvements in their local areas, we might expect prices to have 
capitalized those improvements by 1990. While we do not believe that the general public was aware of attainment 
status and likely future changes in air quality owing to the 1990 CAAA, if there were some capitalization of anticipated 
pollution reductions by 1990, it would lead us to underestimate the impact of the 1990 CAAA. 
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 One concern is that if house price trends across regions are correlated with patterns of air 
quality improvements, it could bias our estimates of the effects of pollution reductions on home 
values. To address this issue, we include as a control local home price indices from Freddie Mac, 
and specifically the conventional mortgage home price index (CMHPI). We use MSA-level indices 
when available and state-level indices otherwise.20 In effect, our estimates reflect the effects of 
changes in PM10 on changes in prices beyond those that would be expected given regional price 
trends. In robustness tests, we also consider pre-treatment trends in neighborhood conditions to 
address concerns that neighborhoods in and out of attainment were on different initial trajectories. 
 
V. Results 
A.  First-Stage Results 
We begin with an analysis of the first-stage estimates of the relationship between non-
attainment and air pollution reductions. The results for the 0-1 mile ring appear in Table 2. The 
first-stage is identical for owners and renters, as the regressions include the same controls. We 
show results from a just-identified model using the fraction of years between 1992 and 1997 that 
the monitor is out of attainment as an instrument (column (1)) as well as results from an 
overidentified model using both the fraction of years between 1992 and 1997 that a monitor is out 
of attainment as well as the fraction of years between 1992 and 1997 that a county is out of 
attainment (column (2)). 
Consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 1, the results in column (1) show that, relative 
to areas with monitors always in attainment, areas with monitors out of attainment experience an 
                                                     
20 Results using home prices deflated by these local indices are very similar to our main estimates; these results are 
available upon request. As a robustness test (discussed in Section V.D), we also consider regressions with region fixed 
effects, which additionally control for any unobserved trend in home prices at the region level. The results are very 
similar to the main estimates. 
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11.9 ?g?m3 decline in PM10. Given the mean value of the monitor-level instrument is 0.4, the 
average monitor in the non-attainment group experiences a decline in PM10 of 4.7 ?g?m3. The 
overidentified model in column (2) reveals that both monitor non-attainment and county non-
attainment are associated with declines in PM10. Again echoing Table 1, the results imply that the 
largest drops in PM10 occur near non-attainment monitors that are located in counties out of 
attainment, while smaller drops occur near attainment monitors that are located in counties out of 
attainment. The coefficient estimates in the just-identified and overidentified models are highly 
significant, and with F-statistics of 19 and 15, respectively, the instruments appear to be highly 
relevant.21  
B.  Reduced-Form Results 
The reduced-form relationships between non-attainment status and changes in house prices 
and rents appear in Panel A of Tables 3 and 4. We show results for prices and rents within rings 
of 0-1 mile, 1-3 miles, 3-5 miles, 5-10 miles, and 10-20 miles around monitors, and present 
specifications with only the monitor instrument and specifications with both instruments. 
For homeowners (Table 3), there is a striking pattern across rings in each model, with house 
price growth strongly positively related to non-attainment within close rings but increasingly less 
related to non-attainment in more distant rings around monitors. This is consistent with reductions 
in pollution that are confined to relatively small areas around non-attainment monitors. Indeed, 
based on the reduced-form estimates, it appears that declines in pollution near non-attainment 
monitors only occur within about five miles from the monitor. If the reductions in pollution were 
more evenly distributed over a wide area, we would expect to see a stronger relationship between 
non-attainment status of a monitor and house prices even in more distant rings around the monitor. 
                                                     
21 The corresponding first-stage regressions for each ring beyond 1 mile appear in Table A5 in the online appendix. 
Results are very similar, but change slightly due to different values of the control variables. 
 18 
 
However, the results suggest that non-attainment status matters only for tighter rings around the 
monitor.22  
The reduced-form results for renters in Panel A of Table 4 show a different pattern than those 
for homeowners. With the exception of the 1-3 mile ring, where rents are positively related with 
non-attainment status, there appears to be very little relationship between non-attainment and rents.  
C.  Second-Stage Results 
In Panel B of Tables 3 and 4, we present the second stage results from our IV analysis for 
homeowners and renters for each ring around monitors and for just-identified and overidentified 
models.23 We apply the reduction in pollution measured at the monitor level to each ring, although 
based on the reduced-form results, there is reason to believe that declines in pollution tend to be 
larger in smaller rings than in larger rings. Given this, we would expect estimates of ? in equation 
(2) to be upper bounds on the true reduction in pollution experienced in more distant rings. In turn, 
we would expect the IV estimates of ? in equation (1) to be biased downward in absolute value for 
the larger rings. 
Focusing on the homeowner results for the 0-1 ring around monitors and using the just-
identified model (Table 3, column (1)), the IV estimates imply that a one unit decrease in PM10 
increases house prices by a statistically significant 0.92%. The estimate in the overidentified model 
(column (2)) is similar at 1.33% (which is also statistically significant). The implied elasticity of 
house prices with respect to PM10 reductions is about -0.6. This is roughly twice as large as Chay 
                                                     
22 If it were the case that homeowners in more distant rings value air quality improvements less than homeowners 
close to monitors, the results could still be consistent with more evenly distributed pollution reductions. However, as 
Figure 2 shows, residents of more distant rings are on average much richer than those in closer rings, and past research 
suggests that if anything, richer homeowners value air quality improvements more than poorer homeowners (Fullerton 
2011).  
23 For the interested reader, Table A6 in the online appendix presents cross-section and first-difference regression 
results.  
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and Greenstone’s (2005) estimate of the elasticity of house prices with respect to reductions in 
total suspended particulates (TSPs). 
The IV estimates of the impacts of pollution reductions on house prices get smaller, albeit not 
statistically different from one another, as we consider larger rings of up to five miles around 
monitors. Using estimates from the just-identified model, the increase in home values on average 
in response to a one unit decline in PM10 measured at the monitor is 0.82% for houses 1-3 miles 
from the monitor and 0.67% for houses 3-5 miles from the monitor. Echoing the reduced-form 
results, we do not detect any significant capitalization of air quality improvements in housing 
prices in the 5-10 mile ring or 10-20 mile ring.  
Based on these results, we can calculate the implied marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP), the 
annual dollar amount a household would pay to face one unit less of PM10. To convert house prices 
to annual expenditure, we assume an 8% interest rate and a 30-year mortgage.24 The implied 
MWTP for a one-unit reduction in PM10 (in dollars) based on our preferred estimates are stable at 
around $120-$130 for rings within five miles of the monitor. This MWTP estimate is consistent 
with other estimates based on different data sets and identification strategies. For example, Bayer 
et al. (2009) find a MWTP of $149 ($1982-84) using decennial census data and an IV strategy 
based on long-range pollution transport. Bajari et al. (2012) use sales data from a single city and 
estimate a MWTP of $94. Lang (2012) uses a panel of individual housing units and a similar 
identification strategy as this paper and finds a MWTP of $212, suggesting aggregation bias is 
minimal. 
Meanwhile, the results in Panel B of Table 4 suggest that, with the exception of the 1-3 mile 
ring, there is no discernible impact of changes in air pollution on rents. For the 1-3 mile ring, the 
                                                     
24 We choose 8% because it is roughly the average 30-year mortgage rate that prevailed during the 1990s.  
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just-identified IV estimates imply that a one unit decrease in PM10 increases rents by a statistically 
significant 0.32%. The implied elasticity of rents with respect to pollution reductions is -0.2. 
Notably, for renters in the 1-3 mile ring, the implied MWTP is substantially lower than for 
homeowners at only $27. These results imply that, for the 1-3 mile ring, capitalization of air quality 
improvements in rents is only 40% of that in housing prices.25  
D.  Supporting Analysis  
We conducted a series of robustness checks and supplementary analyses, including 
specifications incorporating pre-1990 trends, analyses using different sets of monitors, regressions 
using alternative instrument definitions, and tests for sorting.  
Robustness Checks – In Table 5, we show results for a number of other robustness tests for 
homeowners.26 First, we examine the extent to which pre-treatment trends in neighborhood 
conditions affect the results. To the extent that neighborhoods that experienced large reductions in 
pollution levels were already on an upward trajectory, we might attribute further improvements to 
changes in air quality, when in fact they might have occurred even in the absence of the 1990 
CAAA and regulator efforts to reduce local pollution. In Panel A of Table 5, we show results in 
which we include as controls differences between 1980 and 1990 in log median income, share 
black, log population, and log housing units.27 We lose close to 20% of the observations due to 
missing data in 1980, when the country was not fully tracted. Nonetheless, the results are 
remarkably similar with the inclusion of these pre-treatment trends; the IV estimates continue to 
                                                     
25 Though more disaggregated, our results are consistent with those of Grainger (2012), who also examines the 
effects of the 1990 CAAA on homeowners and renters separately. In Table A7 in the online appendix, we find 
qualitatively similar results as his using alternative instruments and different specifications, although there are minor 
discrepancies due to differences in sample construction.  
26 Similar tests for renters are provided in Table A8 in the online appendix. 
27 Information on home values is not available for tracts in 1980. 
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suggest that a one-unit drop in PM10 leads to just over 1% growth in home prices over the decade 
in areas close to a non-attainment monitor, and that appreciation is declining with distance. 
We also consider how our restrictions on the set of monitors included in the analysis affects 
the main results. Results using relaxed reliability restrictions appear in Panel B of Table 5. The 
sample size grows by about 60% when we include monitors whose readings were flagged by the 
EPA as unreliable. In part because of the noisiness of these readings, the strength of our first-stage 
changes little despite the increase in sample size. Meanwhile, the magnitudes of the estimated 
impacts of reductions in PM10 on home values are very similar to the main results. A one-unit 
reduction in PM10 increases home values by 1-1.5% in neighborhoods within three miles of a non-
attainment monitor, but by less than 1% in neighborhoods further from three miles from a non-
attainment monitor.  
Next, we experimented with alternative measures of non-attainment for our instrument. In 
particular, instead of monitor and county non-attainment as instruments, we used the difference 
between annual PM10 concentrations in 1991 and the actual standard as an instrument. This 
captures the extent to which a monitor exceeds the minimum levels, which is predictive of the 
magnitude of subsequent changes in pollution levels. As Panel C of Table 5 shows, the second-
stage estimates of the effect of PM10 changes on house prices are slightly smaller than in our main 
results, but again are qualitatively similar and still statistically significant for the 1-3 mile and 3-5 
mile rings.28  
We also considered a variety of other robustness checks that, for the sake of space, we present 
in the online appendix. First, the results change little when we restrict attention to tracts whose 
boundaries do not change substantively between 1990 and 2000, which suggests that our estimates 
                                                     
28 The first-stage estimates for this instrument appear in Table A9 in the online appendix. 
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are not being driven by any errors introduced in normalizing the geography (Table A10). Similarly, 
if instead of using partial tracts when rings overlap, we restrict attention to whole tracts, the results 
are very similar (Table A11). The estimated effects also change little when we include region fixed 
effects, which allow for differential trends in house prices across regions (Table A12). In additional 
tests, we exploit information about elevation, which affects air pollution concentration, as well as 
distance from monitors to tract centroids; qualitatively, the results are similar in each case (Tables 
A13 and A14).  
In principle, one could take advantage of the cutoff rule determining attainment status to 
conduct a regression discontinuity (RD) analysis in which one only considers a subset of the 
geographic areas with pollution levels within a narrow window around the threshold. Given the 
limited number of areas in our final sample, though, we do not have sufficient power to limit the 
sample to the extent needed to conduct an RD. However, if we drop from the analysis California, 
which has many monitors with PM10 levels that far exceed the cutoff for non-attainment status, 
our results are very similar. These results appear in Table A15 in the online appendix. 
Sorting – A potential concern in interpreting our estimates as the MWTP for air quality 
improvements and in evaluating the distributional and welfare implications of the 1990 CAAA 
more broadly is that households may relocate in response to changes in pollution. Households 
could have sorted prior to 1990, such that those with the greatest distaste for air pollution lived in 
the areas that were initially the cleanest, or also potentially in response to the pollution changes 
induced by the 1990 CAAA during the 1990s, such that those living in neighborhoods with large 
changes in pollution by 2000 were different than those living in the same neighborhoods in 1990.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that the characteristics of neighborhoods close to 
non-attainment monitors changed little between 1990 and 2000, consistent with relatively little 
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sorting in response to 1990 CAAA-induced changes in air quality. As an additional test for whether 
there were systematic changes in households residing in affected neighborhoods, we estimated the 
effect of pollution reductions on the change in the fraction of households that moved in the past 
five years, population density, the number of housing units, and the fraction of housing units that 
are owner occupied. In each case, we instrumented changes in PM10 with our measure of monitor 
non-attainment. One would expect to see differential rates of neighborhood turnover in areas 
experiencing particularly large changes in pollution induced by the policy if there were re-sorting. 
One might also expect to see changes in the size of the population and housing stock in these areas.  
The results of these analyses appear in Table 6. The results suggest that areas that experience 
relatively large policy-induced reductions in air pollution did not see particularly large changes in 
turnover rates, population density, housing units, or housing tenure.29 Additionally, a test for 
sorting based on a correlated coefficient model provides weak evidence of diminishing marginal 
utility with increasing air quality and no evidence of preference-based sorting (see Table A17 in 
the online appendix). While not conclusive given that there may be more subtle changes that we 
cannot detect in our data, these results imply that the sorting and supply responses to PM10 
reductions induced by the 1990 CAAA were not large.  
 
VI. Distributional Implications of the CAAA 
 Earlier work on the distributional impacts of environmental policy typically found that 
environmental policy is regressive, with the costs largely falling on lower income households and 
the benefits appropriated by higher income groups (Banzhaf 2011, Fullerton 2011, Bento 2013). 
                                                     
29 In additional tests reported in Table A16 in the online appendix, we also find little change in the age or racial 
composition of affected neighborhoods. 
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In this section, we take advantage of the IV results to explore the distribution of benefits of the 
CAAA across households.30  
 To the extent that the previous literature has examined the CAAA’s distributional implications, 
it has largely focused on differences in impacts on renters and owners (Grainger 2012). Our results 
suggest that, with the exception of the 1-3 mile ring, rents were largely unaffected by changes in 
pollution induced by the CAAA. Given this, and that we will focus exclusively on heterogeneity 
in the CAAA’s impacts across homeowners in what follows, we will if anything tend to understate 
the progressivity of the program’s benefits.31 We will consider welfare as measured by house price 
appreciation and WTP proportional to income, two commonly used measures in the literature 
(Fullerton 2011). 
Table 7 extends the main results presented in Table 3 to assess the distribution of benefits 
among homeowners in treated areas.32 The first four rows provide summary information on median 
house values, median income, the number of owner-occupied units, and the total value of housing 
for each ring of the treated areas. Echoing Figure 2, both house prices and income increase as ring 
distance increases. MWTP for each ring is calculated using the IV estimates (as described in 
                                                     
30 As Chay and Greenstone (2005) note, while the gradient of the hedonic price function provides the average 
MWTP for a one-unit decline in air pollution, the calculation of WTP requires identification of the MWTP function. 
An approach to obtaining this function is to make strong assumptions on its shape. Freeman (1974) showed that if 
preferences are homogeneous and linear with respect to air quality such that the MWTP for clean air is constant, it 
becomes straightforward to calculate WTP. 
31 The IV estimates for renters suggest that, in general, either renters do not value air quality improvements or 
landlords are unable to increase rents (allowing renters to appropriate most of the improvements in air quality). 
Therefore, renters are either unaffected by the program or have actually experienced welfare gains. The exception is 
the renters in the 1-3 mile ring. For these individuals, if they do not value air quality improvements, they would 
experience a welfare loss due to the increase in rents. On the other hand, if they value the improvements by as much 
as homeowners, they would have actually appropriated most of the benefits since rents increased less than housing 
prices. 
32 As Figure A4 in the online appendix shows, there is a large amount of income heterogeneity among homeowners; 
in fact, in 1990, one third of homeowners had household income levels below the mean household income among 
renters. 
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Section V.C) and is displayed in the fifth row.33 In the sixth and seventh rows, we report per house 
appreciation as well as total appreciation due to air quality improvements for each ring; the latter 
is calculated by multiplying per house appreciation by the number of houses. The trends observed 
across rings for MWTP and per house appreciation reflect the results of Table 3; as distance from 
a monitor increases, benefits decline. On the other hand, aggregate appreciation tends to grow as 
distance increases. However, this is entirely driven by higher initial house values and a larger 
number of owner occupied units in more distant areas (see the first and second rows).  
Aggregating house price appreciation across rings and also extrapolating our results to tracts 
around monitors not included in our sample, our results imply that the total benefits of the CAAA 
for the entire country was $44 billion between 1990 and 2000.34 By comparison, Chay and 
Greenstone (2005) found that the improvements in air quality induced by the mid-1970s TSPs non-
attainment designation under the original Clean Air Act were associated with a $45 billion 
aggregate increase in housing values in non-attainment counties between 1970 and 1980.  
The last row in Table 7 presents, by ring, WTP proportional to income. This number is 
calculated by dividing annual benefits received from the CAAA by annual income, where annual 
benefits equal per house appreciation due to the CAAA annualized based on a 30-year mortgage 
with an 8% interest rate. WTP proportional to income is largest in the 0-1 mile ring at 1.13%, and 
then declines gradually for the 1-3 and 3-5 mile rings. WTP proportional to income in the 5-10 
mile is 0.47%, less than half of what it is in the 0-1 and 1-3 mile rings. The benefits proportional 
                                                     
33 We use the magnitude of the estimate for the 5-10 mile ring despite its statistical insignificance, and we set the 
coefficient for the 10-20 mile ring at zero due to its perverse sign. 
34 For homeowners in our sample alone, we estimate that the total benefit of the program amounted to $20.5 billion 
between 1990 and 2000. If we assume that renters value the air quality improvements as much as homeowners, even 
when renters in the 1-3 mile ring pay higher rental prices, the total benefit of the program across households in our 
sample is $30.1 billion. Given that our sample does not comprise the whole country, we scale up the benefits to account 
for the additional 26 counties designated non-attainment by the EPA, assuming households in those counties 
experience the same rates of capitalization. 
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to income are zero in the largest ring. The higher values for closer rings indicate that the benefits 
of the pollution reductions are larger as a fraction of income for those households residing in those 
areas than for households living in more distant rings. Because households tend to be poorer in the 
close rings, these statistics point to progressivity in the distribution of benefits from the CAAA. 
Notably, though, while poorer households living close to monitors benefit greatly from the 
reductions in pollution induced by the 1990 CAAA, a larger number of households living further 
from monitors also benefit, but each to a smaller extent. 
In order to examine how WTP proportional to income varies with income in greater detail, we 
move away from the ring structure and examine the relationships between pollution reductions, 
house price appreciation, and income levels across individual census tracts. To do so, we first 
project the coefficient estimates from Tables 2 and 3 to individual tracts based on the distance 
from each tract’s centroid to the monitor. Then we calculate WTP proportional to income from the 
coefficient estimates and the tract-specific median family income and median house value.35  
Figure 3 displays the relationship between estimated WTP proportional to income and median 
income. The dotted line shows the density of 1990 tract median family income across all tracts in 
our sample; the average median family income is around $50,000, although as the figure makes 
clear, there is some right skew to the distribution. The solid line shows estimates of WTP 
proportional to income as a function of tract median income. WTP proportional to income is clearly 
declining in median income over the range of tracts where the bulk of households live (up to around 
$100,000). There appears to be some nonlinearity in WTP proportional to income above $100,000, 
but there are very few households in that range. Overall, Figure 3 reinforces the results in Table 7 
                                                     
35 This analysis contains both treated and untreated tracts within 20 miles of each monitor. 
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showing that lower income households benefit relatively more on average from declines in 
pollution induced by the CAAA than higher income households. 
We can further quantify the disparities in benefits illustrated in Figure 3 by comparing WTP 
proportional to income across quintiles of the household income distribution. Moving from poorest 
to richest quintile, the average WTP proportional to income is 0.30%, 0.21%, 0.15%, 0.14%, and 
0.12%. In other words, the WTP proportional to income for the poorest quintile is over twice that 
for the richest quintile. This again suggests that, measured on a household basis, that the 
distribution of benefits of the CAAA were progressive. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Using geographically disaggregated data and exploiting an instrumental variable strategy, this 
paper examines the distribution of benefits associated with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
(CAAA). The CAAA created incentives for local regulatory officials to target the dirtiest areas for 
cleanup, leading to geographically uneven reductions in pollution that tended to benefit low-
income households more than high-income households. Using house price appreciation as a 
measure of welfare, households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution received annual 
benefits from the program equal to 0.30% of their income on average, over twice as much as those 
in the highest quintile. Our finding that the program’s benefits were progressively distributed 
among households runs counter to conventional wisdom on the distribution of benefits from 
environmental regulation, which holds that such policies tend to benefit higher income households 
more than lower income households on average.  
Our analysis focuses on the incidence of the CAAA’s benefits as measured by the 
capitalization of air quality improvements into house values. A complete welfare analysis would 
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also account for the distribution any costs of the program not captured in house prices, which past 
studies suggest may be regressive. Indeed, based on changes in the prices of purchased goods, 
Robinson (1985) finds that the costs proportional to income for pollution abatement during the 
1970s were about twice as large for households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution 
than for households in the highest quintile. Assuming the costs of air pollution abatement were 
similarly distributed in the 1990s, then given that our analysis suggests that benefits of the CAAA 
for households in the lowest quintile were about two times larger than those for households in the 
highest quintile, the total costs of the CAAA would need to exceed the benefits for the program to 
be regressive overall. However, the U.S. EPA (2011) estimated that the benefits far exceed the 
costs, possibly by a factor of as much as 30, which implies that the entire program was likely 
progressive. 
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Figure 1.—PM10 Concentration Trends by Attainment Status 
 
Note: The monitor sample includes all 375 monitors that are included in the analysis. A monitor 
is classified as 'monitor non-attainment' if it exceeds either of the EPA standards at some point 
during 1992-1997. A monitor is classified as 'county non-attainment' if it is located in a county 
that is non-attainment at some point during 1992-1997, but is not non-attainment itself. All but 
one monitor designated 'monitor non-attainment' are located in non-attainment counties. 
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Figure 3.—Proportional WTP and Income  
 
Note: The sample of 22,926 census tracts consists of tracts within included counties whose 
centroid is within 20 miles from a sample monitor. Proportional WTP is calculated for each tract 
from the first and second stage IV coefficient estimates in Table 3 and the 1990 median house 
price and median income of the tract. Coefficient estimates from the ring models are assigned 
according to the distance from each tract’s centroid to the monitor. Mean proportional WTP is 
estimated by local polynomial. The income density is estimated by epanechnikov kernel. 
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Table 2.—First Stage Results 
 (1) (2) 
Monitor non-attainment -11.85*** -9.71*** 
 (2.71) (2.67) 
County non-attainment  -2.79*** 
  (0.81) 
F-Statistic 19.17 15.37 
R-Squared 0.29 0.29 
Sample size 375 375 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in PM10 concentration. Both 
regressions include the full set of controls listed in Table A2 in the online 
appendix and use the ratio instruments constructed from years 1992-97. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the 
Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at 
the county level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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